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CASE NOTES
ARBITRATION-QUALIFICATIONS OF ARBITRATORS
ON TRIPARTITE BOARDS
Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York (HIP) is a nonprofit cor-
poration engaged in writing medical care insurance policies. To assure
such care to its policyholders, HIP entered into contracts with groups of
physicians. In identical contracts made by HIP with those Medical Groups
which are petitioners in this action, it was agreed that each of them would
be paid a fixed sum, or "capitation," for each insured person receiving
the services of the particular Medical Group. In addition to such "capita-
tion," HIP agreed to pay each Medical Group an additional sum, termed
"supplemental capitation," in an amount depending upon criteria and
standards which were to be established in the future. If the parties were
unable to agree upon such criteria by a specified date, the unresolved
issues were to go to arbitration. The arbitration clause of the contract
provided, in part, that one arbitrator was to be appointed by HIP, another
appointed by the Medical Group, and the third to be selected by the
arbitrators appointed by the parties.1 When the parties failed to agree
upon the criteria, HIP designated Dr. George Baehr as their arbitrator.
Dr. Baehr was one of the incorporators of HIP, its president from
1950-1957, and currently both a member of HIP's Board of Directors
and one of its paid consultants. The Medical Groups moved for an order
disqualifying Dr. Baehr on the ground of personal interest, bias and
partiality. The Justice of the Special Term granted the motion and the
Appellate Division affirmed by a divided court. The Court of Appeals,
in a 5-4 decision, reversed the decision of the lower court, and permitted
Dr. Baehr to serve as an arbitrator in this dispute. In the Matter of the
Arbitration between the Astoria Medical Group, et al., and Health In-
surance Plan of Greater New York, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 85
(1962).
At the time of the trial Section 1462 of the New York Civil Practice
Act expressed the requirement of impartiality on the part of the arbitrator:
In either of the following cases, the court must make an order vacating the
award, upon the application of any party to the controversy which was arbi-
trated: ...
2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or
either of them. ...
1 For an historical approach to the development of the arbitration process see Gitel-
man, The Evolution of Labor Arbitration, 9 DE PAuL L. REv. 181 (1960).
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A similar requirement is enforced in all those states which permit agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes.2 Here, however, the court took
cognizance of a trend toward liberality in the application of this standard
in the tripartite type of arbitration.3
In early decisions the courts considered the arbitrators to be acting in
a judicial, 4 or at least a quasi-judicial,5 capacity, and, therefore, they were
considered bound by the same rules as govern such officers. Arbitrators
were disqualified, and awards vacated, because the arbitrator had created
a doubt as to his impartiality.6 These acts ranged from formulating an
opinion on the issue to be decided prior to the hearing 7 to having a per-
sonal interest in the outcome of the dispute,8 or at least bearing a close
business relationship to one of the parties to the dispute.9
The courts frequently noted, however, that in arbitration proceedings
such as herein, where special skill and experience are valuable, it is no
disqualification that the arbitrators have had business dealings with either
party to the arbitration.10 Moreover, the court has stated that where the
agreement gave each party the right to appoint an arbitrator, it is natural
that they would appoint someone in whom they had confidence."
2N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A; 24-8 (1961); MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 251, §15 (1956); CAL. CODE
Civ. Pioc. § 1283 (Deering 1953); PURDON PENN. STAT. ANN. ch. 4, § 161 (1930); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (Baldwin 1953); LA. REV. STAT. § 9-4210 (1950); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 57.07 (1959); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 645-9 (1948); Wisc. STAT. §298-10
(1958). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.01 (1957).
8 Gold and Furth, The Use of Tripartite Boards in Labor, Commercial, and Inter-
national Arbitration, 68 HARVARD L. REV. 293 (1954).
4 E.g. Matter of Friedman, 215 App. Div. 130, 135, 213 N.Y. Supp. 369, 374 (1st Dep't
1926).
5 E.g. Empire Plexiglass Corp. v. Levitt Corp., 192 Misc. 251, 77 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Munic.
Ct. 1948).
OE.g. Matter of Friedman, 215 App. Div. 130, 213 N.Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't 1926).
For a thorough discussion of the many relationships which caused awards to be vacated,
see Arbitration Awards Vacated for Disqualification of an Arbitrator, 9 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 56 (1957), or When May an Arbitrator's Award Be Vacated?, 7 Ds PAUL L. REV.
236 (1958).
7 Flannery v. Sahagian, 134 N.Y. 85, 31 N.E. 319 (1892).
8 In re Miller, 260 App. Div. 444,23 N.Y.S. 2d 120 (1940).
9 E.g. Ilios Shipping and Trading Corp. v. American Anthracite and Bitumenous Coal
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 698 (1957).
10 Mater of Atlantic Rayon Corp. (Goldsmith), 277 App. Div. 554, 555 (1st Dep't
1950), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 302 N.Y. 842 (1951). See also Matter of
Meining Co. v. Katakura Co., 241 App. Div. 406 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 418
(1934).
11 Matter of Linwood (Sherry), 14 Misc. 2d 495, 496 (Sp. Ct. Nassau CO. 1958) aff'd,
7 App. Div. 2d 757 (2d Dep't 1958), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 418 (1959). See also Matter of
Perlman, Inc. (Raycrest Mills), 280 App. Div. 744, 747-48 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd 305
N.Y. 803 (1953).
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The court was influenced both by these decisions and by a great volume
of articles written on the current practices in the field of arbitration.12
These articles contend that the parties to a tripartite arbitration tend to
appoint arbitrators "not individually expected to be neutral."' 8
The trend to relaxing the requirements pertaining to the party-desig-
nated arbitrators has been felt in other jurisdictions. An Iowa case recited
that while choosing arbitrators wholly disinterested is an admirable stand-
ard to aspire to, its strict enforcement would enable few awards to stand.
Further, the fact that the arbitrator had previously acted in a like or
similar capacity for the nominator does not disqualify him. "On the con-
trary, it speaks for his competency to act in such capacity."'14 A Federal
court has held that "designation by the parties themselves of arbitrators
who may not be completely disinterested is generally accepted practice
and is not ground for objection at onset or in course of proceedings."' 15
Turning to the case before us, the court said that there can be no doubt
that, when HIP and the Medical Groups agreed to the use of a tripartite
tribunal, they must be taken to have contracted with reference to estab-
lished practice and usage in the field of arbitration.' 6 In light of accepted
practice, which sanctions and contemplates two non-neutral arbitrators
on a tripartite board, the parties must be deemed to have intended that
each was free to appoint any arbitrator desired, however closes his rela-
tionship to the dispute. 17 The parties were free to enter into a contract
which would provide for neutral arbitrators, the court contended, and
by their failure to limit the identity, status or qualifications of the arbitra-
tors, the parties permitted the appointment of "interested" arbitrators.
Also, although Dr. Baehr was an interested party, he would derive no per-
sonal benefit since HIP is a non-profit corporation. All that Dr. Baehr
could do is bring to the arbitration proceeding the wealth of experience
he gathered in his long career in public health administration. This would
be a great aid in the determination of the supplemental capitation.
12 See Bell Aircraft Corp., 13 L.A. 813, 820§21. Lesser, Tripartite Board or Single
Arbitrators in Voluntary Labor Arbitration?, 5 ARB. J. (N.S.) 276; Phillips, A Lawyer's
Approach to Commercial Arbitration, 44 YALE L. J. 31, 47 (1934); Pirsig, The New
Uniform Arbitration Act, 11 BUSINESS LAWYER 44, 47 (April 1956); ELKOURI & ELKOURT,
How ARBITRATION WORKS (Rev. Ed. 1960), p. 48; see also Taylor, The Arbitration of
Labor Disputes, 1 ARB. J. (N.S.) 409,413.
13 Pirsig, The New Uniform Arbitration Act, 11 BusinEss LAWYER, 44, 48 (April
1956); Phillips, A Lawyer's Approach to Commercial Arbitration, 44 YALE L. J. 31, 47
(1934).
14 First Nat. Bank of Cedar Falls v. Clay, 231 Iowa 703, 716, 2 N.W.2d 85, 92 (1942).
15 Petition of Dover Steamship Co., 143 F. Supp. 738, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
16 See Bolles v. Scheer, 225 N.Y. 118, 121, 121 N.E. 771, 772 (1919); see also CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, pp. 62-64.
17 Matter of Lipschultz (Gutwirth), 304 N.Y. 58, 61-62, 106 N.E. 2d 8,9, 10 (1952).
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Another point raised by the respondent was that the motion to dis-
qualify was prematurely brought since the Civil Practice Act", only made
provision to vacate an award on grounds of partiality or bias on the part
of the arbitrators. The court dismissed this contention by claiming in-
herent power to control all litigation before it, and, in the absence of
express prohibition, disqualify an arbitrator before an award is made.19
In conclusion, the court here recognized that the tripartite type of
arbitration has evolved to the point where it is the accepted practice for
the arbitrators appointed by the parties to bear some relation to the ap-
pointing party, with the third arbitrator remaining neutral. 20
Because of the complexity of the disputes which are arbitrated, special
skill, experience and knowledge on the part of the arbitrators is invaluable
in reaching a just and speedy settlement. A person who lacked this back-
ground would require extensive instruction in the technicalities of the
subject matter of the dispute to have that degree of comprehension which
an experienced party would already possess. Undoubtedly these practical
considerations also prompted the New York Legislature, which changed
Section 1462 of the C.P.A. to conform to the common practice and usage
shortly after the HIP Medical Groups decision was reached.21
18 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, S 1462, subd. 2. This provision has been modified.
Cf. note 21, ff.
19 Cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Selly, 295 N.Y. 395, 68 N.E.2d 183 (1946);
Gaer Bros. v. Mott, 144 Conn. 303, 130 A.2d 804, 65 A.L.R. 2d 749 (1957).
20 This view is accepted as morally and socially correct. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBI-
TRATION, I, 8 (1951).
21 CPLR § 7511, subd. (b), par. 1, cl. (ii) signed into law on April 4, 1962: L. 1962,
ch. 308, eff. Sept. 1, 1963. This new law permits a vacatur of an award only where the
partiality is that "of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE ENGEL CASE
IN LIGHT OF PRECEDENT
The State Board of Regents of New York officially proposed the fol-
lowing prayer which they recommended and published as part of their
Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence on thee, and we beg thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our country.'
The respondent, the board of education of the Union Free School Dis-
trict, No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, directed the school district's
1 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962).
